Security and Privacy Challenges in Cognitive Wireless Sensor Networks by Sen, Jaydip
Security and Privacy Challenges in 
Cognitive Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
Jaydip Sen 
Innovation Lab, Tata Consultancy Services Ltd., Kolkata, India 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted a lot of interest in the research community due to their 
potential applicability in a wide range of real-world practical applications. However, due to the distributed 
nature and their deployments in critical applications without human interventions and sensitivity and 
criticality of data communicated, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security and privacy threats 
that can adversely affect their performance. These issues become even more critical in cognitive wireless 
sensor networks (CWSNs) in which the sensor nodes have the capabilities of changing their transmission 
and reception parameters according to the radio environment under which they operate in order to achieve 
reliable and efficient communication and optimum utilization of the network resources. This chapter 
presents a comprehensive discussion on the security and privacy issues in CWSNs by identifying various 
security threats in these networks and various defense mechanisms to counter these vulnerabilities. 
Various types of attacks on CWSNs are categorized under different classes based on their natures and 
targets, and corresponding to each attack class, appropriate security mechanisms are also discussed. Some 
critical research issues on security and privacy in CWSNs are also identified. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted a lot of interest in the research 
community due to their wide range of potential applications. A WSN consists of hundreds or even 
thousands of small devices each with sensing, processing, and communication capabilities to monitor a 
real-world environment. They are envisioned to play an important role in a wide variety of areas ranging 
from critical military surveillance applications to forest fire monitoring and building security monitoring 
(Akyildiz et al., 2002). Most of the WSN deployments operate in the unlicensed ISM bands (2.4GHz). 
Several other small range wireless protocols like Wi-Fi, Bluetooth etc. also use the same band. This has 
led to overcrowding in this band with the increasing deployment of WSN-based applications. As a result, 
coexistence issues in the ISM bands have attracted extensive research attention (Cavalcanti et al., 2007). 
The increasing demand for spectrum in wireless communication has made efficient spectrum 
utilization a big challenge. To address this important requirement, cognitive radio (CR) has emerged as 
the key technology. A CR is an intelligent wireless communication system that is aware of its surrounding 
environment, and adapts its internal parameters to achieve reliable and efficient communication and 
optimum utilization of the resources (Mitola, 2000).With the advent of CR technology, we have a 
different perspective of the traditional WSNs. In the current cognitive wireless sensor networks 
(CWSNs), the nodes change their transmission and reception parameters according to the radio 
environment. Cognitive capabilities are based on four activities: (i) monitoring of spectrum sensing, (ii) 
analysis and characterization of the environment, (iii) optimization of the best communication strategy 
based on different constraints such as reliability, power, security and privacy issues etc., and (iv) 
adaptation and collaboration strategy. The cognitive technology will not only enable access to new 
spectrum but it will provide better propagation characteristics leading to reduction in power consumption, 
network life-time and reliability in a WSN. With cognitive capabilities, WSN will be capable of finding a 
free channel in the unlicensed band to transmit or could find a free channel in the licensed band for 
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communication. A CWSN, therefore, will be able to provide access not only to new spectrum bands in 
addition to the available 2.4 GHz band, but also to the spectrum band that has better propagation 
characteristics. If a channel in a lower frequency band is accessed, it will certainly allow communications 
with higher transmission range in a CWSN, and hence fewer sensor nodes will be required to provide 
coverage in a specific area with a higher network life-time due to lower energy consumption in the nodes. 
CWNs will also provide better propagation characteristics by adaptively changing systems parameters 
like modulation schemes, transmit power, carrier frequency and constellation size. The result will be a 
more reliable communication with reduced power consumption, increased network life-time and higher 
reliability and enhanced quality of service (QoS) guarantee to applications.  
In spite of the several advantages and benefits that CWSNs will bring forth (Cavalcanti et al., 2008), 
ensuring security will be a major challenge in these networks. Unless these challenges are solved to an 
effective level, deployment of CWSNs in real-world applications will face a serious impediment. As 
observed in (Burbank, 2008), the CR nature of a system introduces an entirely new gamut of threats and 
vulnerabilities that cannot be easily mitigated. These three salient characteristics of CR are its 
environmental awareness, learning and acting capabilities. Considering these characteristics from an 
attacker’s perspective, a CWSN will provide much more capability to an attacker to launch attacks that 
are long-lasting and catastrophic in nature and those which can be triggered by simple spectral 
manipulations (Araujo, et al., 2012).   
Security had already been an extensive area of research in WSN (Sen, 2009; Zhou et al., 2009; Martins 
& Guyennet, 2010). With the advent of CWSN and the perspective of security taking a much wider and 
complicated scope, it is obvious that research on the security aspects on CWSNs will attract even more 
attention of the research community. However, despite considerable amount of research on CR networks 
and the new interest in CWSNs, security in CWSNs has been a vastly unexplored area. Sensor data 
privacy will be another critical area which will be increasingly relevant as these networks find more 
applications in deployments that deal with sensitive and critical data.  
Keeping this emerging trend of technology in mind, this chapter intends to provide a panoramic view 
of security and privacy-related issues in WSNs with particular focus on CWSNs. In the following 
sections, we present an extensive discussion on various security issues in WSNs and CWSNs and present 
their appropriate defense mechanisms based on the current state of the art. 
 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN WSNS 
In this section, we present a brief discussion on various security and privacy issues in a traditional WSN. 
All these issues are, however, applicable for CWSNs as well. We also discuss some defense mechanisms 
for handling these vulnerabilities.  
Traditional WSNs are vulnerable to various types of attacks. These attacks can be broadly categorized 
into the following types (Shi & Perrig, 2004): (i) attacks on secrecy and authentication, (iii) attacks on 
network availability, and (iii) stealthy attacks on service integrity. Standard cryptographic mechanisms 
can prevent attacks on the secrecy and authenticity of the messages from outsider attacks such as 
eavesdropping, packet replay attacks, and modification or spoofing of packets. The attacks on network 
availability are also known as the denial of service (DoS) attacks. In stealthy attacks, an attacker 
compromises a sensor node and injects false data. DoS attacks, if launched successfully, can severely 
degrade the performance of WSNs. In the following, we describe how DoS attacks are made on different 
layers of the communication protocol stack.  
 
DoS attacks on the physical layer: The physical layer is responsible for frequency selection, carrier 
frequency generation, signal detection, modulation, and data encryption (Akyildiz et al., 2002). Jamming 
in the physical layer is the most usual way to launch a DoS attack. In the jamming attack, the attacker 
interferes with the radio frequencies that the nodes in a WSN use for communication (Wood & Stankovic, 
2002). The jamming attack is extremely catastrophic. Even with a less powerful jamming source, an 
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adversary can potentially disrupt communication in an entire network by strategically distributing the 
sources of the jamming signal.  
 
DoS attacks in the link layer: The link layer is responsible for multiplexing of data streams, data frame 
detection, medium access control, and error control. The attacks launched on this layer usually create 
collisions, resource exhaustion, and unfairness in allocation. A collision occurs when two nodes attempt 
to transmit simultaneously on the same frequency (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). An adversary may 
strategically cause collisions in specific packets such as ACK control messages. A possible result of such 
collisions is the costly exponential back-off. The adversary may simply violate the communication 
protocol and continuously transmit messages in an attempt to generate collisions.   
 
DoS attacks on the network layer: The network layer of traditional WSNs is vulnerable to different 
types attack such as spoofed routing information, selective packet forwarding, sinkhole, Sybil, wormhole, 
blackhole, grayhole, HELLO flood, Byzantine, information disclosure, and acknowledgment spoofing. In 
the spoofed routing information attack, an attacker targets the routing information in the network by 
spoofing, altering or replaying the routing information to disrupt the traffic in the network. The 
disruptions include creation of routing loops, attracting or repelling the network traffic from selected 
nodes, extending or shortening the source routes, generating fake error messages, causing network 
partitioning, and increasing the end-to-end latency. In the selective forwarding attack, the attacker 
compromises a node in such a way that it selectively forwards some messages and drops the others (Wang 
et al., 2009a). In a sinkhole attack, an attacker makes a compromised node more attractive to its neighbors 
by forging routing information (Karlof & Wagner, 2003). The result is that the neighbor nodes choose the 
compromised nodes as the next-hop node to route their data through. This type of attack makes selective 
forwarding very simple as all traffic from a large area in the network flows through the compromised 
node. In the Sybil attack, a malicious node presents more than one identity in a network. This attack is 
particularly effective on routing algorithms, data aggregation, voting, fair resource allocation, and 
misbehavior detection. In the wormhole attack, a pair of malicious nodes first creates a wormhole. A 
wormhole is a low-latency link between two portions of a network over which one attacker node replays 
messages to the other attacker node (Karlof & Wagner, 2003). In the blackhole attack, a malicious node 
falsely advertises good paths (e.g., the shortest path or the most stable path) to the destination node during 
the path-finding process in reactive routing protocols, or in the route update messages in proactive routing 
protocols. A more delicate form of this attack is known as the grayhole attack, in which the malicious 
node intermittently drops data packets thereby making its detection more difficult. In an HELLO flood 
attack, an attacker uses a high-powered transmitter to fool a large number of nodes and makes them 
believe that they are within its neighborhood (Karlof & Wagner, 2003). Subsequently, the attacker node 
falsely broadcasts a shorter route to the base station and all the nodes that received the HELLO packets 
attempt to transmit to the attacker node. However, since these nodes are out of the radio range of the 
attacker, no communication will be established. In the Byzantine attack, multiple compromised nodes 
work in collusion and carries out attacks by creating routing loops, forwarding packets through 
suboptimal routes, and selectively dropping packets. In an information disclosure attack, a compromised 
node leaks confidential or important information to unauthorized nodes in the network. Such information 
may include data regarding the network topology, geographic location of nodes, or optimal routes to 
authorized nodes. In resource depletion attack, a malicious node attempts to deplete resources of other 
nodes in the network. The typical resources that are targeted are battery power, bandwidth, and 
computational power. The attacks could also be in the form of unnecessary requests for routes, very 
frequent generation of beacon packets, or forwarding of stale packets to other nodes. The 
acknowledgment spoofing attack is launched on routing algorithms that require transmission of 
acknowledgment packets. An attacking node may overhear packet transmissions from its neighboring 
nodes and spoof the acknowledgments, thereby providing false information to the nodes. Routing 
protocols in WSNs are also vulnerable to attacks such as touting table overflows, routing table poisoning, 
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packet replication, route cache poisoning, and rushing attacks. A comprehensive discussion on these 
attacks can be found in (Sen, 2010a). 
 
DoS attacks on the transport layer: The transport layer of WSNs is vulnerable to flooding attack and 
the desynchronization attack (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). If a protocol needs to maintain the state 
information at either end of an established connection, it becomes vulnerable to flooding attack. An 
attacker may repeatedly make new connection requests until the resources required by each connection 
are exhausted or reach a maximum limit. The desynchronization attack, on the other hand, attempts to 
disrupt an existing connection. For example, an attacker may repeatedly spoof messages to an end host 
causing the host to request retransmission of missed frames. The possible DoS and other types of attacks 
on WSNs and their corresponding countermeasures are listed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1:  Various DoS attacks on the protocol stack of a WSN and their countermeasures 
 
Layer Attacks Defense Mechanisms 
 
Physical 
Jamming Spread-spectrum, priority messages, 
lower duty cycle, region mapping, mode 
change 
 
MAC 
Collision Error-correction code 
Exhaustion Rate limitation 
Unfairness Small frames 
 
Network 
Spoofed routing 
information & selective 
forwarding 
Egress filtering, authentication, 
monitoring 
Sinkhole Redundancy checking 
Sybil Authentication, monitoring, redundancy 
Wormhole Authentication, probing 
Hello Flood Authentication, packet leashes by using 
geographic and temporal information 
Ack. Flooding Authentication, bi-directional link 
authentication verification 
 
Transport 
SYN Flooding 
De-synchronization 
Client puzzles, SSL-TLS 
authentication, EAP 
Application Logic errors 
Buffer overflow 
Application authentication 
Trusted computing, Antivirus 
Privacy Traffic analysis, Attack on 
data privacy and location 
privacy 
Homomorphic encryption, Onion 
routing, schemes based on traffic 
entropy computation, group signature 
based anonymity schemes, use of 
pseudonyms. 
 
Node replication attack: In this attack, the attacker attempts to add a node to a WSN by replicating (i.e. 
illegally copying) the node identifier of an already existing node in the network (Parno et al., 2005). A 
node replicated and joined in the network in this manner can potentially cause severe disruption in 
message communication in the WSN by corrupting the packets and forwarding them to wrong routes. 
This may also lead to network partitioning and communication of false sensor readings. In addition, if the 
attacker gains a physical access to the network, it is possible for him/her to copy the cryptographic keys 
and use these keys for message communication from the replicated node. 
 
Attacks on sensor data privacy: Since in many applications WSNs are deployed for automatic data 
collection through efficient and strategic deployment of the sensor nodes, these networks are vulnerable 
to potential abuse of the collected data. Privacy preservation of sensitive data in WSNs is a particularly 
difficult challenge (Gruteser et al., 2003). Moreover, an adversary may gather seemingly innocuous data 
to derive sensitive information if he/she knows the aggregate data is collected from multiple sensor nodes. 
This is analogous to the “panda hunter problem”, in which the hunter can accurately estimate the location 
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of the panda by systematically monitoring the traffic (Ozturk et al., 2004). Some of the common attacks 
on sensor data privacy are: (i) eavesdropping and passive monitoring, (ii) traffic analysis, and (iii) 
camouflage. The most common form of attack on sensor data privacy is carried out by an attacker by 
silently listening to the messages communicated over the network. Eavesdropping on the control channels 
can be extremely effective strategy for an adversary to launch different attacks. The attacker may combine 
passive eavesdropping with an active traffic analysis. For example, by an effective traffic analysis, an 
adversary can identify some nodes that have special roles delegated to them. The attacker can then launch 
a directed attack to these nodes. In a camouflage attack, an adversary compromises a sensor node and 
later on uses the victim node to masquerade as a normal node.   
 
Security Mechanisms in Traditional WSNs 
Numerous security mechanisms are proposed by researchers for defending against various attacks on 
WSNs. In the following, we provide a very brief discussion on some of these mechanisms. Interested 
readers may refer to (Sen, 2009) for a detailed discussion on these security protocols and algorithms. 
 
Applications of cryptographic mechanisms: Since most of the security mechanisms for WSNs use 
cryptography, selecting the most appropriate cryptographic mechanism is a critical issue. The 
cryptographic algorithms and protocols must meet the constraints of the sensor nodes and should be 
evaluated by their code sizes, data sizes, processing time, and computational power requirements. It was a 
popular belief for long that the code size, processing time, and power requirements of the public key 
algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol or RSA signatures are too heavy for WSN 
nodes. However, subsequent studies have shown that it is feasible to apply public key cryptography in 
WSNs by right selection of algorithms and associated parameters, optimization, and the use of low-power 
techniques (Wander et al., 2005). Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is particularly suitable for WSNs 
since it provides the same level of security as the RSA algorithm using a much smaller key size, thereby 
reducing the processing and communication overhead. In general, however, the private key operations in 
the public key cryptographic schemes are still expensive and most of the private key-related operations 
are assumed to be either carried out by the base stations or on some selected sensor nodes which have 
higher computational resources.  
 
Key management protocols: Since the existence of a robust and efficient key management protocol is an 
essential pre-requirement for successful operation of a cryptographic mechanism, design of attack-
resilient key management schemes that meet the resource constraints in such networks is a challenging 
task. The goal of key management is to establish keys among the nodes in a secure and reliable manner 
and to support node addition and revocation. Due to the high computational overhead of most of the 
public key cryptosystems, majority of the existing key management schemes for WSNs are based on 
symmetric key cryptography. A large number of key management protocols for WSNs exist in the 
literature. A detailed discussion on key management in WSNs can be found in (Sen, 2009). 
 
Defense mechanisms against the DoS attacks: Since DoS attacks can be launched at different layers of 
the protocol stack, the defense mechanisms at different layers follow different approaches. In the physical 
layer, jamming attack can be defended by employing variations of spread-spectrum communications such 
as frequency hopping and code spreading (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). In frequency-hopping spread 
spectrum (FHSS), signals are transmitted by rapidly switching a carrier among many frequency channels 
using a pseudo-random sequence that is known to both the transmitter and the receiver. As a potential 
attacker would not be able to predict the frequency selection sequence, it will be impossible for him/her to 
jam the frequency being used at a given point of time. Another approach for handling jamming attacks in 
WSN is to tolerate the attacks by correctly identifying the jammed part of the network and effectively 
avoiding the nodes in the affected part by routing messages around it. In the link layer, frame collision 
attacks are handled by using error-correcting codes (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). The resource exhaustion 
attacks are prevented by applying rate-limiting admission control mechanism in the medium access 
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control (MAC) layer so that the requests from nodes that intend to exhaust the energy-reserves of a node 
are rejected. Use of time-division multiplexing is another approach to defend against energy exhaustion 
attacks (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). Time-division multiplexing eliminates the need of arbitration for each 
frame and solves the indefinite postponement problem in a back-off algorithm. The adverse impact of 
caused by an attacker who intermittently launches link layer attacks can be mitigated by the use of small 
frames since it reduces the amount of time an attacker gets to capture the communication channel. 
 
Defense against attacks on the routing protocols: Numerous mechanisms are proposed for defending 
against attacks on the network layer and on the routing protocols of WSNs. Since a detailed discussion of 
these schemes is beyond the scope of this chapter, we provide only a very brief discussion on some of the 
current and popular mechanisms. A detailed discussion can be found in (Sen, 2009).  
A popular way to prevent spoofing and alteration of the routing packets is to append a message 
authentication code (MAC) to the routing packets. To defend against replayed information, counters or 
time-stamps are used in the messages (Perrig et al., 2002). Selective forwarding attack may be prevented 
using multipath routing (Karlof & Wagner, 2003). Hu et al. have proposed a mechanism called “packet 
leashes” for detecting and defending against wormhole attacks (Hu et al., 2003). As shown in Figure 1, in 
a wormhole attack, two or more malicious nodes collude together by establishing a tunnel using an 
efficient communication medium (i.e., a wired link or a high-speed wireless connection). During the route 
discovery phase, the route request messages are forwarded between the malicious nodes using the 
established tunnel. Therefore, the request message that reaches first at the destination node is the one that 
is forwarded by the malicious nodes. Consequently, the malicious nodes are added in the path from the 
source to the destination. Once the malicious nodes are included in the routing path, the malicious nodes 
drop the packets, resulting in complete or partial DoS attack. Sen et al. have presented a cooperative 
detection scheme that exploits the redundancy in routing information in an ad hoc network to build a 
robust detection framework for identifying malicious packet dropping nodes (Sen et al., 2007a). In (Sen et 
al., 2007b), a cooperative grayhole attack detection mechanism is proposed that utilizes a robust 
distributed collaborative algorithm among the nodes in an ad hoc network. Di Pietro et al. proposed a 
mechanism for securing group communications in WSNs (Di Pietro et al., 2003). The protocol is known 
as LKHW (Logical Key Hierarchy for Wireless sensor networks) and it is based on directed diffusion-
based multicast mechanism. Lazos and Poovendran propose a similar tree-based key distribution scheme  
(Lazos & Poovendran, 2002). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of a wormhole attack launched by malicious nodes M1 and M2 
 
As discussed earlier in this section, most of the routing protocols for WSNs are vulnerable to various 
types of attacks such as: selective forwarding, sinkhole, blackhole, grayhole etc (Sen, 2010a). In the 
following, we briefly mention some of the well known propositions.  
Liu & Ning propose a protocol called µTESLA– micro version of the time, efficient, streaming, loss-
tolerant authentication protocol- for providing broadcast authentication in WSNs (Liu & Ning, 2004). 
 7
The protocol introduces an asymmetry through a delayed disclosure of the symmetric keys, leading to an 
efficient broadcast authentication scheme. Zhu et al. have proposed a scheme known as LEAP (Localized 
Encryption and Authentication Protocol) that is based on construction of a one-way key-chain for one-hop 
broadcast authentication (Zhu et al., 2003). In this scheme, each node generates a one-way key chain of 
certain length and transmits the first key of the key chain to each of its neighbor encrypting it with their 
pairwise shared keys. Deng et al. propose an “intrusion-tolerant routing protocol in wireless sensor 
networks” (INSENS) that adopts a routing-based approach to security in WSNs (Deng et al., 2002). A 
suite of security protocols called “SPINS” is proposed in (Perrig et al., 2002). Du et al. investigated the 
possible use of public key cryptography in designing secure routing protocols for WSNs (Du et al., 2005). 
Tanachaiwiwat et al. propose a secure routing protocol called “trusted routing for location aware sensor 
networks” (TRANS) that uses a symmetric key cryptographic scheme based on loose-time 
synchronization mechanism to ensure message confidentiality (Tanachaiwiwat et al., 2003).  
Papadimitratos et al. present a secure route discovery protocol that guarantees correct topology discovery 
in a WSN (Papadimitratos & Haas, 2002). The protocol relies on the use of MAC and an accumulation of 
the node identities along the route for a secure network topology discovery.  
 
Defense against attacks on the transport layer: For defending against the flooding DoS attacks at the 
transport layer, Aura et al. proposed the use of “client puzzles” (Aura et al., 2001). In client puzzle-based 
schemes, each client has to demonstrate its commitment to the connection by solving a puzzle before it 
can access any resource in a server. Since an attacker does not have infinite resources, it will be 
impossible for him/her to create new connections fast enough to cause resource starvation on the serving 
node.  A possible defense against desynchornization attacks is to enforce a mandatory requirement of 
authentication of all packets communicated between the nodes (Wood & Stankovic, 2002). If the 
authentication mechanism is secure, an attacker will be unable to inject any spoofed message. 
 
Defense against the Sybil attack: A defense mechanism against the Sybil attack must ensure that a 
framework is in place that can validate a particular identity is only being held by a given physical node 
(Newsome et al., 2004). Random key pre-distribution techniques (Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002) can 
effectively be used to defend against the Sybil attack. In random key pre-distribution, a random set of 
keys or key-related information is assigned to each sensor node so that in the key setup phase, each node 
can discover or compute the common keys shared by it with its neighbors. The common keys are used as 
shared secret session keys to ensure node-to-node secrecy.  
 
Defense against node replication attack: Parno et al. have proposed a mechanism for distributed 
detection of node replication attacks in WSNs (Parno et al., 2005) using two approaches: (i) randomized 
multicast and (ii) line-selected multicast – both of which are based on collaborative participation of 
multiple sensor nodes. The randomized multicast algorithm distributes location information of a node to 
randomly selected witnesses and exploits the birthday paradox to detect replicated nodes. The line-
selected multicast algorithm is based on rumor routing (Braginsky & Estrin, 2002), and it uses network 
topology-related information to detect node replication. 
  
Defense against the traffic analysis attack: Deng et al. propose a mechanism for defending against 
traffic analysis attacks in WSN (Deng et al., 2005a).  The authors have identified two different classes of 
traffic analysis attacks: (1) rate monitoring attack and (2) time correlation attack. In rate monitoring 
attack, an adversary first monitors the packet sending rate of the nodes in its neighborhood, and then 
moves closer to the nodes that have a higher packet sending rate. In a time correlation attack, the 
adversary observes the correlation in sending times between a node and its neighbor node that is assumed 
to be forwarding the same packet and deduces the path by following each forwarding operation as the 
packet propagates towards the base station. Deng et al. have proposed mechanisms to defend against both 
these attacks (Deng et al., 2005a). 
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Defense against attacks on sensor privacy: Since protection of privacy of sensitive data in the sensor 
nodes in WSNs is an important requirement in many applications, several schemes for this purpose have 
been proposed by the researchers. These schemes can be broadly divided into three categories: (1) 
anonymity schemes, (2) policy-based schemes, and (3) schemes based on information flooding. An 
anonymity scheme depersonalizes the data before it is released from its source. Gruteser et al. present an 
analysis on the feasibility of anonymizing location information in location-based services in an 
automotive telematics environment (Gruteser & Grunwald, 2003). Beresford et al. propose various 
anonymity techniques for an indoor location system based on the Active Bat (Beresford & Stajano, 2003). 
Sen proposes an efficient and reliable routing protocol for wireless ad hoc and mesh networks that 
preserves user privacy while providing robust authentication for the users (Sen, 2010b). In policy-based 
defense mechanisms, decisions on access control and authentication are made on the basis of a specified 
set of privacy policies. Molnar et al. present the concept of private authentication and demonstrate its 
application in the radio frequency identification (RFID) domain (Molnar & Wagner, 2004). Hengartner et 
al. propose a framework of an access control on location information (Hengartner & Steenkiste, 2003). 
Use of information flooding is a popular approach to achieve privacy in communication. Ozturk et al. 
propose modifications to WSN routing protocols for protecting the location information of a source node 
by using randomized data routing and a phantom traffic generation mechanism (Ozturk et al., 2004). 
Deng et al. address the problem of defending a base station against physical attacks by concealing the 
geographic location of the base station (Deng et al., 2005b). Xi et al. present an attack on the flooding-
based phantom routing approach presented by Ozturk et al (Ozturk et al., 2004) and describe “greedy 
random walk” (GROW) protocol to reduce the chance of an eavesdropper successfully collecting the 
communicated location information (Xi et al., 2006). Li et al. propose a scheme that provides both content 
confidentiality and source-location privacy using a two-phase routing mechanism (Li & Ren, 2009). 
  
Secure data aggregation: In a WSN, certain nodes - called the “aggregators” - are responsible for 
carrying out data aggregation operations so as to optimize the utilization of precious bandwidth of the 
wireless links. If an aggregator node or a sensor node is compromised, it is easy for an adversary to inject 
false data into the network. In absence of a robust authentication mechanism, an attacker can fool the 
aggregators into reporting false data to the base station. For securing the aggregation process in WSNs, 
two types of techniques are used: (1) plaintext-based protocols and (2) ciphertext-based protocols. The 
plaintext-based protocols operate on plaintext information. Hu et al. propose a secure aggregation 
protocol on plaintext data using µTESLA in which the sensor nodes are organized into a tree with the 
internal nodes acting as the aggregators (Hu & Evans, 2003). Chan et al. have presented a “secure 
information aggregation” (SIA) framework for sensor networks (Chan et al., 2007). Cam et al. propose an 
“energy-efficient pattern-based data aggregation” (ESPDA) protocol for WSNs (Cam et al., 2006). Du et 
al. propose a “witness-based data aggregation” (WDA) scheme for WSNs to ensure validation of data 
fusion nodes to the base station (Du et al., 2003). Secure aggregation of ciphertext data in WSNs is 
required to preserve the privacy of sensor nodes in many applications (Castelluccia et al., 2009; He et al., 
2007). The propositions are based on a particular encryption transformation called “privacy 
homomorphism” (PH) that allows direct computations on encrypted data.  
 
Defense against physical attacks on nodes: The sensor nodes in a WSN can be protected against 
possible tampering by tamper-proofing the physical packages of the sensors. Propositions are made by 
researchers for building tamper-resistant hardware in order to make the memory contents on the sensor 
chips inaccessible to a potential external attacker (Anderson & Kuhn, 1997). Deng et al. propose various 
approaches for protecting sensors by deploying components outside them (Deng et al., 2005b). In another 
work, Deng et al. discuss defense mechanisms against search-based physical attacks (Deng et al., 2002). 
Wang et al. present a modeling framework for “blind” physical attacks on WSNs (Wang et al., 2005). 
Seshadri et al. propose “software-based attestation for embedded devices” (SWATT) to detect a sudden 
change in the memory content of a sensor indicating the possibility of an attack (Seshadri et al., 2004). 
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Trust management: A popular approach to enforce a high-level of security in WSNs is to deploy trust- 
and reputation-based frameworks. Issues such as judging the quality and reliability of the sensor nodes 
and the wireless links, robustness of the data aggregation operation, correctness of the aggregator nodes, 
and timeliness in packet forwarding by the sensor nodes can be addressed very effectively with the help 
of trust-based systems. A comprehensive discussion on trust and reputation and various security 
mechanisms based on these concepts can be found in (Sen, 2010c). Here, we briefly mention some of 
these schemes. Pirzada et al. propose an approach for building trust relationships between the nodes in an 
ad hoc network based on their packet forwarding behavior (Pirzada & McDonald, 2004). Oram describes 
various methods of finding paths from a source node to a designated target node in a peer-to-peer 
computing paradigm (Oram, 2001). Extending this approach, Zhu et al. provide a practical approach for 
computing trust in wireless networks (Zhu et al., 2004a). Sen proposes a trust-based secure and efficient 
searching scheme for peer-to-peer networks that utilizes topology adaptation by the trusted nodes (Sen, 
2011). Yan et al. discuss a trust-based security framework to ensure data protection and secure routing in 
an ad hoc network (Yan et al., 2003). Ren et al. present a probabilistic approach to model a distributed 
trust framework for a large-scale ad hoc network (Ren et al., 2004). Ganeriwal et al. propose a reputation-
based framework for high-integrity sensor networks using the beta distribution for reputation 
representation, updates and integration (Ganeriwal & Srivastava, 2004). Liang et al. present models for 
robust aggregation algorithms which can be adapted for WSNs (Liang & Shi, 2008).   
 
SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN CWSNS 
In this section, we discuss various security vulnerabilities which are specific to CWSNs. In conventional 
WSNs, the transmission parameters can be changed and the radio frequency (RF) bands can be used in the 
limits which have been defined by pre-defined standards and spectrum regulations. The implementations 
in the hardware and firmware are done based on these specifications and they cannot be changed 
dynamically during network communications. A cognitive wireless sensor network (CWSN), other hand, 
can communicate in a wide range of spectrum bands and it is capable of changing its transmission 
parameters dynamically during network communication in response to the changes in the sensed radio 
spectrum environment, signals received from other sensor nodes in the network. This capability is 
gainfully utilized to realize innovative spectrum management approaches like dynamic spectrum access 
(DSA) in which the allocation of spectrum bands to communication services can change with time or 
space. An attacker can compromise a CWSN by breaking the DSA mechanism by implementing spectrum 
misuse or by exhibiting selfish behavior. For example, the attacker node can transmit in an unassigned 
band or it can ignore the cognitive messages sent by the other nodes in the CWSN. DSA can be 
implemented using various architectures for the CWSNs, each architecture having its own specific 
security vulnerabilities. In most of the centralized and distributed approaches of DSA, it is assumed that 
the participating nodes are altruistic and make logical decisions to optimize the use of the spectrum 
resources. However, such approaches make CWSNs vulnerable to security threats, where malicious 
cognitive nodes may exhibit selfish behavior. Hence identification of various possible attacks on CWSNs 
is critical in order to design appropriate security schemes to defend against those attacks. As an 
illustration of one security issue in CWSNs, Figure 2 shows a scenario of a hidden node problem, in 
which two cognitive nodes have different perceptions of the spectrum because of their different locations.  
In addition to all the vulnerabilities in the traditional WSNs that we have discussed earlier in this 
chapter, CWSNs have many other security problems. Some of common attacks on CWSNs are: (i) attacks 
on the communication protocols, (ii) masquerading attacks, (iii) unauthorized access to the spectrum, (iv) 
physical attacks on the sensor nodes, (v) internal failures of the sensor nodes, (vi) power exhaustion 
attacks on the sensor nodes, (vii) attacks on the objective functions of the cognitive engine, (viii) attacks 
on the administrative policies of the sensor nodes, (ix) attacks on the cryptographic protocols and security 
schemes, and (x) attacks on the privacy of the sensor data. In the following, we briefly discuss the 
aforementioned threats and vulnerabilities in CWSNs.   
 
  
 
Figure 2. An illustration of the hidden node problem in a CR network
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In a DoS attack, the attacker makes the resources in the network unavailable to its legitimate users. 
There are many different ways in which a DoS attack may be launched – (i) jamming attack, (ii) collision 
attack, (iii) routing disruption attack, (iv) flooding attack etc.  
In a jamming attack, the attacker transmits radio signals that interfere with the radio frequencies used 
by the nodes in a network. As discussed earlier, various ways of launching jamming attacks in WSNs and 
their defense mechanisms have been extensively studied by researchers over the last decade. In CWSNs, 
jamming attacks could be detrimental since it can rapidly exhaust the energies in the nodes and disrupt 
communication in the network. In a typical jamming attack in CWSN, a malicious node transmits signals 
at a high power using the PU frequency thereby disrupting the communication in the network. Jamming 
of the channels used to distribute cognitive messages in CWSNs is another serious threat. This attack can 
be launched against an out-of-bound cognitive control channel (CCC) or in-band CCC if the frequency of 
the channel is known. The objective of the collision attack is to violate the communication protocols used 
in CWSNs. While an attacker need not spend much energy in launching such an attack, the attack can 
cause serious damage in network services. Since the wireless medium is inherently broadcast in nature, 
detection of collision attacks and identification of the malicious nodes are non-trivial tasks. Since in 
CWSNs, the SUs share the spectrum, collision attack can easily and very effectively disrupt 
communications among the SUs. Hence, the collision attacks are more detrimental in CWSNs than in 
WSNs. In routing disruption attack, a malicious attacker does not forward the routing messages. The 
grayhole and the blackhole attacks are examples of these types of attacks. As already discussed in this 
chapter, these attacks are also possible in traditional WSNs. In a flooding attack, a malicious node sends a 
number of fake connection requests to a target victim node resulting in resource depletion in the latter. In 
malicious alteration of cognitive message attack, the adversary intentionally changes the cognitive 
messages in the network so that correct information cannot be exchanged among the nodes. The Sybil 
attack is launched by an attacker node that can assume multiple identities. This type of attacks can cause 
routing disruption, and unfair resource allocation in a resource sharing environment and in voting and 
reputation-based systems. For instance, the Sybil attack may be launched by a malicious node to generate 
additional reputations for malicious nodes or to change the information about the sensed spectrum. The 
hidden node problem arises when a CR node is in the protection region of an incumbent node but it fails 
to detect the existence of the incumbent. For example, if a CR node does not sense the presence of a 
primary user base station (BS) because of an obstacle, it transmits in the same frequency bands of the 
primary user, causing harmful interference. In the saturation of the cognitive control channel attack, the 
attacker launches a DoS attack against the cognitive control channel (CCC) by sending a large number of 
cognitive messages to the CCC thereby making the services of the control channel unavailable to other 
nodes in the CWSN. In the eavesdropping of cognitive radio messages, an attacker passively listens to the 
cognitive messages and subsequently uses the information contained on those messages to launch 
powerful attacks. In the attack involving disruption of the MAC, network layer, and the cognitive engine 
of a CWSN, an adversary attempts to target the protocols in the higher layers of the stack. 
 
Masquerading Attacks 
This vulnerability involves the scenario in which a malicious adversary masquerades a primary user in a 
CWSN. The malicious attacker may mimic the primary user characteristics in a specific frequency band 
so that the legitimate secondary users erroneously identify the attacker as an incumbent and they avoid 
using that frequency band. This can be a selfish attack, because the attacker may subsequently use the 
frequency bands or launch a DoS attack to deny access to the spectrum resources to other secondary 
nodes in the CWSN. An example of the masquerading of a primary user in a CWSN is shown in Figure 4. 
A malicious CR node transmits a signal which is very similar to the primary user. On sensing this false 
signal, other CR nodes detect the presence of an additional primary user, and they avoid using the 
spectrum bands. In another form of a masquerading attack, a malicious CR node masquerades an honest 
node while collaborating with the other nodes in a CWSN to carry out important network functionalities 
such as: spectrum sensing, spectrum sharing, spectrum management, and handling of spectrum mobility. 
 This form of an attack can be dangerous since the malicious n
spectrum sharing while participating in the collaborative decision making processes in a CWSN.
 
 
Figure 4. An illustration of the masquerading of a primary user in a CR network
 
Chen and Park introduced one important variation of 
user emulation (PUE) attack (Chen & Park, 2006; Chen et al., 2008c
in dynamic spectrum access (DSA) environments
frequency bands and can use those bands whenever they wish. However, when the primary users are idle, 
the secondary devices can opportunistically use the spectrum on those bands. Such secondary users need 
spectrum sensing algorithms to detect when the primary user is active. To attack 
attacker needs to create a waveform that is sufficiently similar to that of the primary user so that a false 
positive may be triggered in the spectrum sensing algorithm. With the false si
attacker, the secondary users in the communication range of a primary user erroneously conclude that the 
primary user is active and vacate the channel. 
to the specified frequency band.  
manipulation attack (Clancy & Goergen, 2008)
of PUE attack can be launched when the attacker has some prior knowledge 
et al., 2010). For example, if the attacker knows the e
CWSN, the attacker can launch the PUE attack during those time periods. 
secondary users refrain from transmitting
the signal is emitted by a primary user. 
effectively launch a PUE attack. Some 
users and accordingly make prediction 
waveforms can lead to a belief-manipulation attack
 
Unauthorized Access of Spectrum
A malicious adversary node in a CWSN can launch an attack so that it can use spectrum bands for which 
it is not authorized or licensed and thereby gain more traffic capacity or bandwidth. Moreover, a 
malicious node can also emit power in
  
 
ode may spread false information about 
 
masquerading attack that is known as the 
). This attack is extremely effective 
. In DSA, the primary users own lic
a DSA
gnal being emitted by the 
As a consequence, the adversary will gain unrivaled access 
However, this attack is transient in nature since it is a 
.  Leon et al. have shown how a more sophisticated form 
about the CR network
xact time of occurrence of the quite periods
Since during a 
, if any user receives a signal during this period 
A malicious user may transmit during the quite period and 
DSA algorithms gather channel access information of the primary 
(Clancy & Walker, 2006). In such cases, spoofing primary user 
 on the secondary users (Clancy & Goergen, 2008
 
 unauthorized spectrum bands to cause DoS to the primary users.
12
 
 
primary 
enses to different 
 algorithm, an 
sensory 
 (Leon 
 of the 
quite period, all 
it assumes that 
).  
 
 13
Physical Attacks on the Sensor Nodes  
Physical attacks such as tampering with or damaging the hardware of even a small number of sensor 
nodes in a CWSN can prove to be catastrophic on the network operations. Since the functioning of a 
CWSN is dependent on the correctness of the critical information exchanged among the nodes, the 
adverse impact due to node compromise is more severe in CWSNs than in traditional WSNs. In a 
traditional WSN, compromise of a few nodes usually has a minor impact on the network performance 
since the connectivity is still maintained due to enough redundancy. However, successful operation of a 
CWSN is dependent on the distributed information among the nodes and their cooperative behavior. 
Hence, even a single compromised node in a CWSN can be a very powerful weapon for an attacker.  
 
Internal Failures of the Sensor Nodes  
Failure of CR nodes in a CWSN may occur due to various reasons, i.e., memory fault, physical failure or 
other hardware failure. The impact of these failures may be quite damaging on the network services. For 
example, a malfunctioning CR node may transmit signals in a wrong frequency band or may not properly 
participate in important spectrum management-related collaborative decision making processes. 
 
Power Exhaustion Attacks on the Sensor Nodes  
The sensor nodes are battery powered and energy constrained. To deplete the energies in the sensor 
nodes, an attacker can launch various types of power exhaustion attacks such as the sleep deprivation 
attack by engaging it in exchange of unnecessary message communications to quickly drain off its 
energy. If the attacker intelligently selects the target nodes, the failure of the nodes can cause network 
partitioning. In another form of power exhaustion attack, the attacker node can request a channel change 
very frequently causing a high rate of power usage in the target nodes. 
 
Attacks on the Objective Functions of the Cognitive Engine  
In CWSNs, the cognitive engine in a sensor node has many radio parameters under its control. The 
cognitive engine determines the suitable values of these parameters over time in order to optimize its 
multi-goal objective functions (Clancy & Goergen, 2008). Various attacks are possible on the learning 
algorithms of the cognitive engines so that these algorithms produce suboptimal outputs. Since these 
attacks are targeted on the learning algorithms, they are also known as the belief- manipulation attacks. 
Clancy & Goergen have identified various input parameters of the cognitive engines such as: center 
frequency, bandwidth, transmit power, type of modulation, coding rate, channel access protocol, 
encryption algorithm, frame size etc (Clancy & Goergen, 2008). The cognitive radio may have three goals 
such as achieving low-transmit power, high rate of transmission, and high security in communication. 
Based on the application currently under use, the cognitive engine assigns different weights to these three 
goals to maximize its overall objective function. In order to build a robust framework, in the learning 
phase, the radio tries out various combinations of different values of the input parameters, measures the 
observed statistics of the network such as bit error rate, and then evaluates the objective function.   
 
Attacks on the Administrative Policies of the Sensor Nodes 
The operating behavior of the sensor nodes in a CWSN are controlled by setting different policies in the 
nodes. These policies include security and privacy policies that determine access control, authentication, 
encryption/decryption, key revocation and other related operations. Several attacks can be launched on 
these policies such as: (i) excuse attack (ii) newbie-picking attack etc. (Araujo et al., 2012). If the security 
policies in the nodes are very generous and allow faster recovery of nodes that might have crashed or 
damaged and if these policies do not require nodes to prove their authenticity, a malicious node may 
exploit these policies by repeatedly claiming to have crashed/damaged thereby launching the excuse 
attack. In this way, wrong spectrum information can be sent to the network frequently to cause overload 
in the network. If a CWSN policy requires new nodes to pay their dues by making it mandatory for them 
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to give information to the network for some period of time before they can consume any shared resource, 
a veteran node could move from one newbie node to another, leeching their information without being 
required to give any information back. This attack is known as newbie-picking attack.   
 
Attacks on the Cryptographic Protocols and Security Mechanisms  
These attacks attempt to break the security mechanisms in the network and the nodes by compromising 
the cryptographic protocols used. The objectives of these attacks are to break the cryptographic 
algorithms, extract the keys used in encryption, decryption and hash computation, and to identify any 
possible vulnerability in the software and hardware of the nodes. Since the nodes in a CWSN are 
inherently resource constrained, the cryptographic schemes implemented in these nodes are light-weight 
in nature. These light-weight schemes sometimes prove inadequate against powerful and sophisticated 
attacks launched by high-end automated tools used by the attackers. An attacker may also launch attacks 
on the key management scheme in the network by using different strategies such as: naïve brute force 
attack, sophisticated dictionary attack, and passive session monitoring attack to capture important session-
related information. One example of a sophisticated attack is the differential power analysis (DPA) attack, 
in which an attacker measures the strengths of the electromagnetic signals emitted from a target node to 
successfully identify the key used for encryption and decryption of messages.   
 
Attacks on the Privacy of the Sensor Data  
Attacks on sensor data privacy are critical attacks since in many deployments of traditional WSNs and 
CWSNs, the sensor nodes collect and transmit sensitive data which need privacy protection. In CWSNs, 
the nodes share resources (i.e., spectrum) to establish communications among them and for developing a 
framework so that they are aware of the environmental parameters under which they are operate. If the 
privacy of such information is not protected, an adversary can successfully extract sensitive information 
from several nodes and may launch more powerful attacks on the network using the extracted 
information. The attacks on the privacy of the sensor nodes may involve different strategies such as: 
eavesdropping, impersonation, and traffic analysis. In passive eavesdropping attack, the attacker silently 
listens to the communications among the nodes to extract useful information about the session, and uses 
that information to launch a replay attack or an impersonation attack. In an impersonation attack, the 
attacker impersonates a legitimate node in the network and establishes communications with other nodes 
by providing its fake identity. An adversary node may monitor the messages to and from the legitimate 
nodes in a CWSN to launch a traffic analysis attack. The acquired information from traffic analysis is 
usually used later by the malicious adversary for devising more catastrophic attacks on the network. 
Location privacy threats represent a unique challenge in CWSN deployment. This is mainly due to the 
fact that a secondary user’s spectrum sensing report on the signal propagation of the primary users are 
highly correlated to its physical location. Hence, similar to geo-locating individuals via WiFi or Bluetooth 
signals, a malicious attacker may exploit the correlation to geo-locate the secondary user and thus 
compromise the user’s location privacy. Gao et al. have identified various types of attacks on the location 
privacy of the nodes in CR networks which are relevant in CWSNs as well (Gao et al., 2012).  
 
RELATED WORK ON IDENTIFICATION OF CWSN THREATS 
In this section, we present a detailed discussion on the some of the existing works in the literature 
identifying various types of attacks on CWSNs and the mechanisms of launching these attacks. 
 
Jamming attack: Sampath et al. present various ways in which jamming attacks can be launched on 
single channel and multi-channel 802.11 standard-compliant networks (Sampath et al., 2007). In the 
single channel jamming attack, the attacker continuously transmits high-power signals in the channel and 
causes interference to the communications from legitimate users in the network. In order to minimize 
energy consumption and to make the detection of the attack difficult, the attacker can also take a periodic 
jamming strategy in which the attacker transmits jamming packets at periodic intervals of time. In this 
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strategy, the impact of jamming depends on the length of inter-jamming interval, the size of the jamming 
packets, and the size of the data packets sent to the victim node. It has been found that the impact of 
jamming degrades gracefully with the increase in inter-jamming interval, while the use of large packet 
size at the victim node increases the impact of jamming. In multi-channel jamming attacks, the attacker 
manipulates the CR to switch frequently across different channels and jam multiple channels 
simultaneously. Since, in addition to fast channel switching, the nodes in a CWSN have advanced channel 
sensing capabilities, the attacker can use a CR node to build up channel usage patterns of network users, 
and switch only among the channels are currently under use. These types of highly intelligent and 
efficient attacks are very difficult to detect in CR networks. Burbank et al. present a detailed description 
on how various types of jamming attacks can be targeted in a CR network and how adverse these attacks 
can be on the overall network performance (Burbank et al., 2008). All these attacks are relevant in 
CWSNs as well. Sethi and Brown discuss various ways in which DoS attacks can be launched on CR 
networks and present a framework to analyze those attacks (Sethi & Brown, 2008). The framework, 
known as the “Hammer Model Framework”, graphically presents the potential risks sequences for DoS 
attacks, and investigates various types of vulnerabilities that may prevent CR communication is specific 
spectrum bands or completely deny a CR network to communicate or induce it to cause harmful 
interference to its existing legitimate users. In addition to jamming attacks, the authors have also 
considered attacks related to malicious alterations of cognitive messages and masquerading of a CR node 
by a malicious adversary. Zhang et al. propose a classification of various attacks on a CR network which 
can adversely affect its learning capability and its ability to gainfully utilize the benefits of dynamic 
spectrum access (Zhang et al., 2008). Arkoulis et al. have identified, analyzed and explained the security 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of cooperative, dynamic and open spectrum access environments that can 
be targeted by a malicious adversary to disrupt the network operations or degrade its performance 
(Arkoulis et al., 2008). The authors have followed an approach for identifying threats based on the types 
of anomalous behavior of the nodes such as: misbehavior, selfishness, cheating, and malicious intention. 
Burbank presents some major security threats in CR networks in general, and identifies various 
challenges in defending against these threats (Burbank, 2008). In order to identify specific security 
challenges in CR networks which are applicable for CWSNs as well, the author has first pointed out two 
fundamental differences between a traditional wireless network and a CR network. In the CR networks 
the attacker has: (i) the potential far reach and long-lasting nature of an attack, and (ii) the ability to have 
a profound effect on network performance and behavior through simple spectral manipulation by 
generating false signals. In a CR network, the nodes exchange locally-collected information to construct a 
perceived environment that that determines the current and future behavior of the nodes. The author 
argues that in a CR network, a malicious adversary can propagate its behavior through the network in the 
same way a malicious worm propagates in a network. The adversary can carry out spectral manipulation 
for influencing the behavior of a set of local CRs or a distant CR as well. The author has also identified 
various features of CR networks and the implications of these features on potential attacks on these 
networks. Brown and Sethi present a multidimensional analysis and assessment of various DoS attacks on 
all types of CR networks (Brown & Sethi, 2007). The authors have carried out vulnerability analysis of 
CR network against various DoS attacks using different parameters such as network architecture 
employed, the spectrum access technique used, and the spectrum awareness model. The attacks are 
categorized into two types: denial attacks and induce attacks. While the denial attacks are intended to 
prevent communications in the network, the induce class of vulnerabilities stimulate the CR node to 
communicate causing interference with a licensed transmitter. The adverse impact of these attacks is not 
reflected immediately. However, these attacks cause permission policies to be tightened or eliminated 
potentially denying network services over a long-term. In multi-dimensional analysis of DoS attacks, a 
number of metrics such as jamming gain, jamming efficiency, packet send ratio, and packet delivery 
radio, have been proposed.  
 
Primary user emulation (PUE) attack: Chen et al. have identified a threat to spectrum sensing, named 
the primary user emulation (PUE) attack in which an adversary’s CR transmits signals whose 
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characteristics emulate those of incumbent signals (Chen et al., 2008c). This attack is particularly easy to 
launch in CWSNs due to the highly flexible and software-based air interfaces of CR sensor nodes. The 
PUE attack can be catastrophic since it severely interferes with the spectrum sensing process and reduces 
the channel resources available to the legitimate unlicensed users in the network. In another work, Chen et 
al. have discussed two different security threats on CR network which are known as incumbent emulation 
(IE) attack and spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack (Chen et al, 2008b). The IE attack is 
essentially same as the PUE attack since the primary users are also sometimes referred to as the 
incumbents. The SSDF attack is carried out by malicious secondary nodes that transmit false spectrum 
sensing data to other nodes. This attack is critical in a CWSN, since sending of false spectrum sensing 
information to a data collector in the network can cause the data collector to make a wrong spectrum 
sensing decision resulting in a catastrophic impact on the network performance.  
Wang et al. have argued that one of the major challenges in CR networks is to detect the presence of 
primary users’ transmission, since malicious secondary users can send false spectrum sensing information 
and mislead the spectrum sensing data fusion process to cause collision, interference and inefficient 
spectrum usage (Wang et al., 2009c). Clancy and Khawar have highlighted the need of robust signal 
classification mechanisms for CR networks so that different types of transmitters can be differentiated in 
a particular frequency band in order to defend against the PUE attacks (Clancy & Khawar, 2009). Anand 
et al. present a novel analytical framework to analyze the feasibility of PUE attack in a CR network which 
can be applied to a CWSN as well (Anand et al., 2008).  
 
Masquerading attack: Masquerading attacks on a CR node and attacks involving malicious alteration of 
CR nodes for disrupting spectrum sensing functions have also been studied extensively. Wang et al. have 
shown the adverse effect of malicious and compromised secondary users in a CR network (Wang et al., 
2009b). Chen et al. have considered the security issues related to malicious secondary users reporting 
false spectrum sensing information due to Byzantine failure in a distributed spectrum sensing 
environment in a CR network (Chen et al., 2008a). The Byzantine failures, such as device malfunction or 
attacks severely affect the spectrum sensing functions in a CR network since these failures or attacks can 
enable an attacker to constantly report the spectrum in a band being in use causing severe under-
utilization of the available spectrum. Hu et al. have also addressed the issue of Byzantine failures of 
secondary users in a CR network, and have proposed a security mechanism that is similar WSPRT, in 
which the binary local reports used in WSPRT are replaced with N-bit local reports to achieve an 
enhanced detection performance (Hu et al., 2009). Mody et al. have discussed various security threats in 
IEEE 802.22 standard-compliant devices which are deployed in CR networks (Mody et al., 2009).  
 
Attacks involving false spectrum reports sent secondary users: The threats due to false spectrum 
reports sent by malicious secondary users are also critical. Securing the control channels ensures that CR 
messages communicated over these channels cannot be altered by a malicious adversary. This protection 
is critical in CWSNs which are deployed for mission-critical applications. In this perspective, Safdar and 
O’Neill have identified the need of securing the cognitive control channels to perform channel 
negotiations before data communication among the nodes in a CR network (Safdar & O’Neill, 2009). The 
authors propose a novel framework for providing common control channel security for co-operatively 
communicating CR nodes so that a pair of CR nodes can authenticate each other. Li and Han have 
discussed a critical security issue in collaborative spectrum sensing in which malicious secondary user(s) 
sends false spectrum report to thwart the spectrum data fusion process (Li & Han, 2010).  
 
Attacks on cognitive control channels: Securing cognitive control channels is an extremely important 
security issue in CR networks. Prasad have argued that design of a CR network poses many new technical 
challenges in protocol design, power efficiency, spectrum management, spectrum detection, environment 
awareness, novel distributed algorithms design for decision making, distributed spectrum measurements, 
quality of service (QoS) guarantees, and security (Prasad, 2008). The author have identified various 
research challenges for security in CR networks and have presented the security and privacy 
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requirements, threat analysis and an integrated framework for security using fast authentication and 
authorization architecture. The particular focus of the proposed security framework is to defend against 
jamming attacks and attacks on the cognitive control channels (CCCs) in CR networks.  
 
Attacks on the MAC layer: Zhu and Zhou have provided a security analysis of the MAC protocols used 
in CR networks by investigating the impact of DoS attacks on these protocols (Zhu & Zhou, 2008). In 
order to make a security analysis of the MAC protocols, the authors have distinguished two types of 
attacks and then discussed how DoS attacks can be successfully launched on the MAC protocols. The 
authors have also presented a detailed discussion on MAC layer greedy behaviors in CR networks and the 
factors that determines the efficiency of the DoS attacks.  
 
Attacks on the cognitive engines: Clancy and Goergen identify three classes of attacks on the cognitive 
engine of CR networks (Clancy & Goergen, 2008). All these types of attacks manipulate the behaviour of 
the CR system such that the radio acts either sub-optimally or even sometimes maliciously. Three classes 
of attacks are identified: (i) sensory manipulation attacks against policy radios, (ii) belief manipulation 
attacks against the learning radios, and (iii) self-propagating behaviour leading to cognitive radio viruses. 
In a policy radio, the main vulnerability lies in the fact that an attacker can spoof faulty sensor 
information that can cause the radio to select a sub-optimal configuration. Since the radio sensors take 
digitized RF and extract useful statistics from it, by manipulating the RF that is available to the radio, an 
attacker can cause faulty statistics to appear in the CR knowledge base. The learning radios are also 
vulnerable to the same threats as the policy radios. However, since a leaning radio uses all its past 
experiences in building its long-term behvaior, attacks on it are much more detrimental. For example, an 
attacker can transmit a jamming signal whenever a policy radio attempts to switch to a faster modulation 
rate. This will always force the CR to operate at a lower modulation rate, resulting in lower links speeds 
and link degradation. The authors have called these attacks as belief manipulation attack since these 
attacks can potentially have long-term adverse impact of the learning radios. The self-propagating 
behaviour of the radio can be utilized by a malicious attacker to launch the most powerful type of attack. 
In such an attack, the state on radio causes a behaviour that can induce the same state on another radio. 
Once the target radio attains the state, it exhibits behaviour that leads to a state change in another radio so 
that it attains the same state. Eventually, the same state propagates through all radios in a particular area 
in the CR network. The net effect is that of a cognitive radio virus that propagates through the network. 
 
Threats related to the hidden node problem: The threats related to the hidden node problem in CR 
networks have also been studied extensively by the researchers. Biswas et al. propose a technique to 
handle both wideband and cooperative spectrum sensing tasks in a distributed spectrum sensing 
environment (Biswas et al., 2009). Nuallain presents a fast and robust propagation method for addressing 
the hidden node problem in a CR network (Nuallain, 2008). Bliss have investigated the optimal spectral 
efficiency for a given message size that minimizes the probability of causing disruptive interference for a 
CR network (Bliss, 2010). The goal of the work is to have an optimization between longer transmit 
duration and wider bandwidth versus higher transmit power so as to tackle the hidden node problem. 
It may be noted that among all the threats in CWSNs, jamming and masquerading of the primary users 
are most critical. Another interesting point to note is that some of the attacks can be correlated to launch a 
powerful two-phase attack. For example, an attacker may first eavesdrop on cognitive messages and then 
may replicate and modify the cognitive messages to transmit false information.  
 
SECURITY MECHANISMS TO DEFEND AGAINST ATTACKS IN CWSNS 
In this section, we first identify the main security requirements in a CWSN and then discuss various 
security schemes for defending against various attacks. In a CWSN, the sensor nodes participate in 
collaborative spectrum sensing activities. Gao et al. have identified the following security requirements in 
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CWSNs (Gao et al, 2012): (i) authentication mechanisms, (ii) incentive mechanisms, (iii) data and 
message confidentiality, (iv) privacy protection of the sensor data.  
 
Authentication mechanisms: A robust authentication mechanism is a prime requirement in collaborative 
spectrum sensing. The authentication scheme may have different perspectives to different categories of 
nodes in a CWSN. The authentication of the primary users is a critical issue since an attacker may 
transmit signals with high power that has close resemblance with the signals of a primary user and launch 
a primary user emulation (PUE) attack (Chen et al., 2008c; Liu et al., 2010). To prevent such an attack, 
the secondary users should have a robust verification scheme for verifying the authenticity of the received 
signals. Similarly, when the secondary users receive the sensing reports from other users, they should be 
able to verify the authenticity of the other secondary users; otherwise, a potential adversary may be able 
to spoof the identity of a secondary user. The authentication of sensing reports distributed across the 
network is also a very important issue. Even if the authentications of the secondary users are done during 
the sensing report aggregation process, it is still possible for a malicious secondary user to send false 
sensing reports and launch spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack (Wang et al., 2009b). 
Hence, each sensing report in the aggregation process should be authenticated.  
 
Incentive mechanisms: Most of the current collaborative sensing schemes assume that the secondary 
nodes voluntarily participate in spectrum sensing. However, this assumption may not hold good for 
selfish secondary users who may not cooperate in order to conserve their own resources (Wang et al., 
2010). Such selfish behavior may seriously degrade the performance of a CWSN. Incentive schemes are 
necessary for minimizing the probability of such selfish behavior.  
 
Data and message confidentiality: The sensing reports need to be well protected so that these messages 
are not misused by unauthorized external users. Data and message confidentiality can be achieved by 
using end-to-end robust encryption algorithms which in turn needs mutual authentication and 
authorization among the collaborating nodes participating in spectrum sensing.  
 
Privacy preservation of sensor data: Privacy protection is primarily for preserving the anonymity of the 
sensing nodes and/or privacy of its location. Location privacy protection attempts to prevent a possible 
adversary form linking a sensing node’s sensing report to the physical location of the sensing node.  
In order to satisfy the aforementioned security requirements and to defend against various possible 
attacks on the sensor nodes in a CWSN, various defense mechanisms are proposed by the researchers. 
These security schemes can be broadly divided into the following categories: (i) mechanisms for 
enhancing the robustness in sensor inputs, (ii) schemes based on the reputation and trust of the nodes, (iii) 
mechanisms based on identification of masquerading attack by signal analysis, (iv) robust authentication 
schemes using appropriate cryptographic algorithms, (v) mechanisms for preventing unauthorized access 
to the spectrum, (vi) mechanisms for defending against attacks on the MAC layer and the cognitive 
engine of the network, (vii) schemes for increasing the robustness of the cognitive control channel against 
jamming and saturation attacks, and (viii) schemes using geo-location database of the primary users in the 
network. In the following, we present a brief discussion on these various types of security mechanisms. 
 
Enhancing the Robustness in Sensor Inputs  
Many of the attacks on CR networks can be defended if the reliability of sensor inputs is enhanced. For 
example, if the cognitive radios can minutely identify the differences between interference and noise, they 
can distinguish natural and artificial RF events. Such sensors can feed specialized policy algorithms that 
specifically look for hostile signals that may be try to subvert a radio’s belief. In a distributed computing 
scenario, a group of cognitive nodes can fuse sensor data to improve the performance of the overall 
network. For example, if multiple sensor nodes exchange time-synchronized RF information, they can 
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cross-correlate the exchanged information to arrive at a more precise identification of an attacker. The 
task becomes challenging, however, since the all sensory inputs are imprecise to a certain extent.  
 
Reputation and Trust-based Security Systems  
A significant number of schemes have been proposed by the researchers using reputation and trust of the 
CR nodes for defending various types of attacks. Using the concepts of reputation and trust, a CR node 
can be mapped to a particular level of reputation and trust on the basis of the spectrum sensing 
information the node shares with other CR nodes. If the information shared by the node is found to be not 
correct after a certain number of iterations, then the specific CR node is considered to be malicious and 
appropriate action is taken against the node based on pre-defined security policies.  
Zeng et al. have proposed a reputation-based cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) framework using 
trusted nodes in a CR network for achieving correctness in the global decisions on spectrum sensing 
(Zeng et al., 2010). In the proposed scheme, at the beginning, sensing information from trusted nodes is 
only considered reliable and used in the decision making. Reputations of other CR nodes are put in the 
pending state, and they are accumulated through a consistency check between the global and local sensing 
decisions. The information received from the nodes which have their trust values greater than a pre-
defined threshold is then considered reliable and their sensing results are incorporated in the CSS. The use 
of reputation system increases the robustness of cooperative sensing scheme. Duan et al. propose a 
spectrum sensing algorithm that is based on the reputation of the nodes (Duan et al., 2009). The algorithm 
is effective in mitigating the effects of shadowing and fading in wireless channels and in eliminating the 
problem related to fail sensing in CR networks with double threshold detector. Li and Han have presented 
an anomaly detection algorithm for identifying attackers in a collaborative spectrum sensing environment 
(Li & Han, 2010). The proposed scheme does not assume any a priori information about the strategy used 
by the attackers in launching the attack, which makes scheme suitable for real-world deployment.  
Kaligineedi et al. propose an attack detection scheme to identify malicious users that send false spectrum 
sensing information in a CR network (Kaligineedi et al., 2008). The proposed scheme uses the average 
power obtained from the real-valued reports received from the CR nodes for making a global decision on 
spectrum sensing. Chen et al. present a security scheme based on weighted sequential probability ratio 
test (WSPRT) to address Byzantine failures on CR nodes in the data fusion process of collaborative 
spectrum sensing (Chen et al., 2008a). The mechanism involves an allocation of a reputation rating to 
each node based on the consistency of its local sensing report with the final decision in the spectrum 
sensing. Peng et al. discuss various security aspects in cross-layer design of CR networks and propose a 
novel architecture in which dynamic channel access is achieved by a cross-layer design between the PHY 
and the MAC layers of a CR network (Peng et al., 2009). The proposed architecture is able to handle 
Byzantine failure of nodes. Anand et al. have analyzed the performance limitations of collaborative 
spectrum sensing in a DSS environment under Byzantine attacks where malicious users send false 
spectrum sensing data to the fusion center leading to increased probability of incorrect sensing results and 
wrong global decisions being taken by the CR (Anand et al., 2010). It has been shown that if the 
percentage of Byzantine attackers in a CR network exceeds a certain threshold value, the data fusion 
scheme become completely incapable in carrying out reliable data fusion and no reputation-based fusion 
system can achieve any performance gain in the data fusion operation. The authors have presented 
optimal attacking strategies for a given set of attacking resources and have also proposed possible counter 
measures at the data fusion center. Xu et al. propose a collaborative sensing algorithm that uses an energy 
detector with double thresholds and an extended data fusion rules to identify untrusted and possibly 
malicious CR nodes (Xu et al., 2009). Yu et al. have studied the security issues related to the SSDF attack 
in which attacker(s) sends false local spectrum sensing results in a DSS environment (Yu et al., 2009). A 
consensus-based cooperative spectrum sensing scheme is proposed that is inspired from the self-
organizing behavior of animal groups. 
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Detection of Masquerading Attacks by Signal Analysis 
Signal analysis is an important technique used in identification of malicious attacker(s) in CR networks. 
This method is very effective in addressing security threats which involve a malicious attacker 
masquerading as an incumbent transmitter by transmitting unrecognized signals in one of the licensed 
bands and thereby effectively preventing secondary users in the CR network from accessing the same 
spectrum band. Spectrum sensing can be done in a variety of ways. Some of the commonly used spectrum 
sensing methods are: energy detector based sensing (also known as radiometry or periodogram), 
waveform-based sensing, cyclostationarity-based sensing, radio identification-based sensing, matched 
filtering, multi-taper spectral estimation, wavelet transform-based estimation, Hough transform, and time-
frequency analysis  (Yucek & Arslan, 2009). However, each of these spectrum sensing techniques have 
vulnerabilities in a CR network since an adversary can masquerade a primary or a secondary user or by 
emulating its signal. Various security schemes have been proposed by researchers to detect and defend 
against such attacks. Some of the mechanisms are briefly discussed in the following.  
Chen and Park propose a security mechanism for defending against masquerading of a primary user by 
a malicious adversary (Chen & Park, 2006). The proposed scheme is based on a transmitter verification 
procedure that employs a location verification scheme to distinguish incumbent signals (i.e., signals from 
a primary user) from unlicensed signals masquerading as incumbent signals. Location verification is 
achieved by using two techniques: (i) distance ratio test (DRT), which uses the received signal strength 
indicator (RSSI) of a signal source and (ii) distance difference test (DDT), which uses relative phase 
difference of the received signal as the signal is received at different receivers. It is assumed that the 
location information of some of the CR nodes in the network is always known a priori either because 
these nodes are fixed or they use trusted GPS information. These CR nodes perform DRT and DDT 
operations within their coverage areas and also serve as the location verifiers (LVs). The LVs exchange 
the location information of incumbent transmitters through a cognitive pilot channel. Zhao and Zhao 
propose a cooperative detection scheme that can suppress malicious users (Zhao & Zhao, 2009). In the 
proposed scheme, the secondary users collaborate by exchanging and using decision fusion on the local 
decision results instead of using the detected energy. A mechanism of weighted coefficients is used which 
updates the weights of the coefficients recursively according to the deviations between separate decision 
information and the combined final results. Zhao et al. propose an identification mechanism of the CR 
nodes using an analysis of the transmitted signals in which wavelet transform is used to magnify the 
fingerprints of the transmitter characteristics (Zhao et al., 2010). This PHY-layer authentication approach 
is intended to prevent the PUE attack in CR networks. Afolabi et al. have describe a PHY layer attack 
model that exploits the adaptability and flexibility of the CR networks and propose a waveform pattern 
recognition scheme to identify emitters and detect camouflaging attackers by using electromagnetic 
signature (EMS) of the transceiver (Afolabi et al., 2009). The EMS of a device is computed based on the 
distinctive behavior in the waveform being emitted by the components of the transceiver including the 
frequency synthesis systems, modulator sub-systems, and the RF amplifiers. Clancy and Khawar present 
sophisticated signals processing algorithms like cyclostationary analysis, classification engines, or signal 
feature extraction for identifying false signals in CR networks (Clancy & Khawar, 2009). The authors 
propose the use of unsupervised learning in feature-based signal classification and provide 
recommendations to mitigate the impact of the attack on CR networks.   
 
Robust Authentication using Cryptographic Techniques 
Cryptographic techniques are widely used in designing robust and efficient authentication protocols in 
wireless networks. However, in CWSNs, authentication mechanism should be adaptable to all 
communication protocols with which the CR nodes have to interface. Hence, design and implementation 
of authentication protocols for CWNs pose significant challenges. 
Kuroda et al. propose a radio-independent authentication framework for CR networks that can be 
integrated with the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) (Kuroda et al., 2007). The protocol is 
suitable for deployment in real-world networks since it allows fast switchover in CR network and does 
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not need any communication with the authentication authorization and accounting (AAA) server for any 
re-authentication of the CR nodes. Jakimoski and Subbalakshmi have proposed an efficient and provably 
secure protocol that can be used to protect the spectrum decision process against a malicious adversary 
(Jakimoski & Subbalakshmi, 2009). The proposed protocol is designed to provide secure spectrum 
decisions in a clustered infrastructure-based network where the spectrum decisions are made at periodic 
intervals and the decision in each cluster is taken independently of the decisions in other clusters.  
The CWSNs should ensure authorization of the cognitive sensor nodes for transmitting specific 
spectrum bands or for performing specific network functions. The authorization is often conditional to the 
nature of the spectrum environment, i.e., the presence of primary users in the area. The authorization is 
needed to define the roles of the CR nodes in performing the CR functions. For authentication and 
authorization purposes, the nodes exchange information through a common CCC. Safdar and O’Neill 
propose a security framework for protecting the information exchanged over the CCC (Safdar & O’Neill, 
2009). 
 
Security Mechanisms for Prevention of Unauthorized Spectrum Access   
A malicious node can access spectrum in a CR network in an unauthorized way either to use the spectrum 
selfishly or to launch a DoS attack on the primary users. Several propositions are made by researchers for 
defending against such attacks. In the following, we provide a brief discussion on some of these schemes. 
Xu et al. present a framework known as TRIESTE (Trusted Radio Infrastructure for Enforcing SpecTrum 
Etiquettes) for ensuring that radio devices are only allowed to access the spectrum according to their 
privileges (Xu et al., 2006). The framework is based on a trusted computing (TC) base in each CR node 
that enforces the policy rules for spectrum access and etiquettes defined in the XG Policy Language 
(XGPL). Atia et al. propose an enforcement structure for defending against malicious attacks (Atia et al., 
2008). The goal of the work is to provide a framework so that the primary users can distinguish between 
the wireless environmental losses and the presence of harmful interference of the secondary users.  
A popular approach for defending against unauthorized spectrum access is to deploy a spectrum 
monitoring system in the CR network. The spectrum monitoring system acts as a spectrum “watch guard” 
for detecting spectrum misuse and carries out the following functions: (i) monitoring of the spectrum 
usage in a specific spatial region and over a range of frequencies, (ii) identifying wireless services and the 
nodes providing such services. However, design of an effective spectrum monitoring system is a 
challenging task since natural or man-made obstacles can change the features of the radio signal, and 
identification of wireless services may be difficult if an attacker can successfully emulate a specific 
wireless service being provided in the network. To address these problems, spectrum monitoring systems 
can be distributed across the nodes. Information on the wireless services in an area can be transmitted to a 
central monitoring location, which can, then, correlate the various inputs and check the received 
information against other data like the known position of the wireless services in the area and their source.  
 
Defense Mechanisms against Attacks on the MAC and the Cognitive Engine 
Attacks on the MAC layer, network layer and on the cognitive engine of a CR network are usually 
defended by making a robust system design. IEEE 802.22 standard provides a robust authentication and 
encryption scheme to mitigate attacks on the MAC layer. As a defense mechanism for the cognitive 
engine, Perich and McHenry propose a policy-based spectrum access control system for the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) NeXt Generation (XG) communications program for 
mitigating the harmful interference caused by a malfunctioning device or a malicious user for a cognitive 
software defined radio (SDR) (Perich & McHenry, 2009). The authors propose two protection 
mechanisms for defending against attacks on the cognitive engine. In the first approach, the authors have 
argued that the likely effect of a threat on a CR network is to disrupt the state machine of the CR network 
and to bring the CR device to an incorrect (i.e. faulty) state. Formal state-space validation, as done with 
cryptographic network protocols, can be applied to the state machine to ensure that a “bad state” is never 
arrived at. In the second approach, the authors propose that the beliefs of the cognitive engine should be 
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constantly re-evaluated and compared to a priori knowledge (e.g., local spectrum regulations) or rules 
(e.g., the relationship between transmit power, propagation, and frequency).  
 
Security Mechanisms for the Cognitive Control Channels 
The cognitive pilot channel (CPC) of a CR network is responsible for distributing the cognitive control 
messages. The CPC is vulnerable to numerous attacks including the DoS attacks and the saturation 
attacks on the control channels. A popular protection mechanism against the jamming attack in a specific 
spectrum band of a CR network is to use frequency hopping. The CPC could use more than one spectrum 
band and “hop” around the spectrum bands to avoid a possible jamming attack. The trade-off is an 
increased complexity of the CR network as the CR nodes should be notified about the change in the 
frequency band of the CPC. If an attacker effectively monitors the CPC, it could “chase” the CPC band 
for every change and eventually cause continual adaptation and outage of service to the CR network.  
Yue et al. present two coding schemes for recovering lost packets transmitted through parallel channels 
for designing an efficient anti-jamming coding technique (Yue & Wang, 2009). The two coding schemes, 
known as rateless coding and piecewise coding, can be adapted to CWSNs for protecting the CPC and 
CCC. Meucci et al. present a lightweight mechanism for achieving security in the PHY layer in a CR 
network using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) (Meucci et al., 2009). In the proposed 
scheme, the user’s data symbols are mapped over the physical sub-carriers using a permutation strategy. 
The security in the PHY layer is achieved using a random and dynamic sub-carrier permutation which is 
based on a single pre-shared information.     
 
Security Mechanisms using Geo-location Database of Primary Users  
In this approach, the CR network provider maintains a database of the positions and transmission 
characteristics (e.g., transmit power) of all the primary users in the network. The CR finds its own 
location information using a GPS and compares the data received from the spectrum sensing functionality 
with the known position of the primary users. Any anomaly in position information triggers an alert for a 
possible malicious attack. Borth et al. propose a protection technique wherein a primary user would 
transmit a beacon to alert secondary users to not transmit in specific spectrum bands (Borth et al., 2008). 
The drawback of this scheme is that the primary user devices are to be modified for beacon transmission. 
 
Table 2 presents a summary of various attacks on CWSNs and their respective defense mechanisms. 
 
OPEN PROBLEMS AND FUTURE TRENDS IN SECURITY IN CWSNS 
Wireless technology is rapidly proliferating into all aspects of computing and communications. There are 
over 8 billion wireless devices in use today (mostly cell phones and mobile computers), and this number 
is expected to increase to about 100 billion by the year 2025 (Steenkiste et al., 2009). However, the 
anticipated exponential growth of the wireless devices and applications is contingent on our ability to 
design radio technologies that continue to work well with increasing deployment density – in particular, 
radio systems must change, and change rapidly, to cope with 2-3 orders of magnitude increase in density 
from 1-0-100 devices/km2 today to 1000-10,000 devices/km2 in 2025. Given the fact that spectrum is a 
finite resource, this calls for disruptive technology innovation in the radio field. Cognitive radios in 
general and cognitive wireless sensor networks in particular offer the promise of bringing just this 
disruptive technology innovation that will enable the future wireless world. Although CWSN technology 
have already emerged from the early stage of laboratory trials and vertical applications supports to 
become a general-purpose programmable radio, there is still a big gap between having a flexible cognitive 
radio, effectively a building block, and the large-scale deployment of CWSNs that dynamically optimize 
spectrum use. Building and deploying a network of cognitive radios is a complex task. The research 
community working on cognitive radio networks need to understand a wide range of issues including 
smart antenna technology, spectrum sensing and measurements, radio signal processing, hardware 
architectures including software-defined radio (SDR), medium access control (MAC), network discovery 
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and self-organization, routing, adaptive control of mechanisms,   policy  definitions    and monitoring, and 
learning mechanisms. Since the core focus of this chapter is on the security and privacy issues in CWSNs, 
we identify some security and privacy challenges that need to be addressed for large-scale adoption of 
these networks in real-world deployments. Following question should be addressed in this regard: 
• What types of denial-of-service and other security attacks are possible using the emerging 
cognitive radio technology? 
• Software weaknesses are known to be a major security problem in the Internet today – what are 
the implications of increasingly software-based radio implementations? 
 
Table 2: Various security vulnerabilities in CWSNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms  
 
Attack Category Specific Attack Type Security Mechanism 
Attacks on 
Communication  
Protocols 
Replay attack Use of robust authentication scheme. 
DoS attack Use of  frequency hopping  in the cognitive 
control channel, code spreading etc. 
Malicious alteration of cognitive 
messages 
Protection techniques based on trust or 
reputation, identification of masquerading 
threats through signal analysis, 
authentication of the CR nodes. 
Sybil attack Use of (i) direct validation techniques of 
nodes including radio resource test, (ii) 
random key pre-distribution with identity of 
each node associated with the assigned 
keys. 
Hidden node problem Data fusion process of collaborative 
spectrum sensing. 
Saturation of cognitive control 
channel 
Robust system design and use of security 
scheme for protection of system integrity. 
Eavesdropping of cognitive radio 
messages 
Protection of message confidentiality. 
Disruption of MAC, network and 
cognitive engine 
Verification of the identities, controlled 
access to the resources, protection of the 
system integrity. 
Masquerading Attacks Primary user emulation attack Protection techniques based on trust or 
reputation, identification of masquerading 
threats through signal analysis, 
authentication of the CR nodes. 
Masquerading of a secondary CR 
node 
Unauthorized Access to 
Spectrum 
Unauthorized use of spectrum band 
for selfish use by an attacker 
A robust and secure framework to enforce 
spectrum policies. 
Unauthorized use of spectrum band 
for DoS attack on primary users 
A robust and secure framework to enforce 
spectrum policies. 
Physical Attacks on 
Sensor Nodes 
Physical compromise of the nodes 
and extraction of cryptographic 
credentials from the sensor nodes. 
Use of (i) tamper-proof sensor hardware, 
(ii) trusted computing platforms in the 
sensors. 
Internal Failure of 
Sensor Nodes 
Physical failure of the sensor node 
hardware or Byzantine failure of 
sensor nodes. 
Use of collaborative sensing techniques and 
secure and distributed data fusion 
algorithms.  
Power Exhaustion 
Attacks on Sensor Nodes 
Sleep deprivation, Frequent channel 
change request to drain energy 
Use of robust authentication and distributed 
collaborative sensing. 
Attacks on the Objective 
Functions on Sensor 
Nodes 
Belief-manipulation on sensors nodes 
so that the overall goal optimization 
module of the network produces 
suboptimal results. 
Use of techniques to enhance robustness in 
the sensory inputs, resilient and 
collaborative learning algorithms in the 
learning phase of the cognitive engine. 
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Attacks on 
Administrative Policies 
of Sensor Nodes 
Malicious alteration in administrative 
policies of sensor nodes. 
Protection techniques based on trust or 
reputation, identification of masquerading 
threats through signal analysis and 
authentication of the CR nodes. 
Excuse attack, Newbie-picking 
attack. 
Use of robust authentication and trusted 
hardware in sensor nodes 
Attacks on 
Cryptographic Protocols  
Malicious attacks on the security and 
key management protocols. 
Use of highly secure protocols with robust 
key distribution and management schemes. 
Attacks on Privacy of 
Sensor Data 
Traffic analysis, eavesdropping on 
sensitive sensor (i.e. source location 
information) 
Use of (i) anonymity mechanisms, (ii) 
flooding – probabilistic and phantom, and 
(iii) onion routing. 
• How does one assure that CRs operate as intended and designed? Is there a trusted cognitive radio 
architecture which can address some of these security concerns? 
• What authentication mechanisms are needed to support cooperative cognitive networks? Are 
reputation-based schemes useful supplements to conventional PKI authentication protocols? 
• How the current protection techniques for spectrum management and spectrum sharing functions 
can be further improved? What link protection techniques could be further incorporated in the 
current security frameworks? 
• How the performance efficiency of the different protection techniques used in collaborative 
spectrum sensing can be evaluated in real-world deployment scenario? 
• How to design and standardize tamper-resistant module to enforce spectrum regulation policies in 
CR nodes and SDR devices? 
 
When viewed from another perspective, cognitive radios offer important new capabilities to defend 
against intrusions or denial-of-service attacks. The spectrum sensing and SDR capability of the radio 
make it feasible to employ recent developments in wireless security in which physical layer properties 
(such as RF signatures) are used for authentication or secure communication. Also, spectrum scanning 
and agility associated with cognitive radios enable networks to   move away from frequency channels 
experiencing denial-of-service attack. Location is another important feature of a wireless network, and 
information on geographic position can also be used to defend against certain types of attacks on 
cognitive networks. Some of the research issues which need to be addressed in this regard are: (i) 
identification of physical layer security enhancements for wireless networks and evaluation of 
performance in real-world deployment scenarios, (ii) evaluation of DoS attacks and methods of defense, 
(iii) use of geo-location for improved wireless network security, and (iv) cooperative methods for 
detecting and isolating intruders. While the ongoing research works on these issues are quite promising, 
evaluations have been mostly limited to lab environments, and it is not clear to what degree these 
techniques will be feasible in real-world deployments, or whether these algorithms, architectures and 
protocols will scale to high density environments. Large scale testing in the CR networks is mandatory for 
this purpose. Since the CWSNs are still in their pre-deployment phase, there is still an opportunity and a 
critical requirement to make security as an integral component of CR network architecture. This will 
require realistic practical evaluation of new techniques as they are designed and developed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The cognitive radio paradigm introduces entirely new types of security threats to wireless networks in 
general and wireless sensor networks in particular. However, wireless security in cognitive radio 
networks is an area that has received relatively less attention, even though security will play a key role in 
the long-term commercial viability of the technology. This chapter has first introduced various security 
threats which are common to both traditional WSNs and the CWSNs. It has then identified various 
additional security threats which are specific to the CWSNs and has discusses several challenges in 
defending against these threats. The chapter has also discussed the current security mechanisms to defend 
against these threats and attacks. A comprehensive taxonomy of the attacks and their respective security 
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schemes are also presented. Some key research challenges in CR networks particularly from the 
perspectives of security and privacy are identified and discussed briefly at the end.  
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KEY TERMS & DEFINITIONS 
Wireless sensor network: A WSN consists of hundreds or even thousands of small devices each with 
sensing, processing, and communication capabilities to monitor a real-world environment. 
Cognitive wireless sensor network: A CWSN is a WSN in which the sensor nodes have the capabilities of 
changing their transmission and reception parameters according to the radio environment under which 
they operate in order to achieve reliable and efficient communication and optimum utilization of the 
network resources. 
Authentication: The mechanism of verification of the authenticity of a user before allowing access to the 
network services is called authentication. 
Primary user: In cognitive radio networks using dynamic spectrum access algorithms, the primary users 
are those who own licenses to different frequency bands and can use those bands whenever they wish. 
Secondary user: In a cognitive radio network, when the primary users are idle, another class of user called 
the “secondary users” can opportunistically use the spectrum on those bands. Such secondary users need 
spectrum sensing algorithms to detect when the primary user is active or not active. 
Denial of Service (DoS): It is a class of attack in which an attacker makes the resources in the network 
unavailable to its legitimate users. There are different ways in which a DoS attack may be launched: 
jamming attack, collision attack, routing disruption attack etc.  
  
Dynamic spectrum access (DSA):  DSA is an innovative spectrum management approach in which 
allocation of spectrum bands for communication services can change with time or space.  
Primary user emulation (PUE) attack: In this attack, an attacker creates a waveform that is sufficiently 
similar to that of the primary user and attacks the DSA algorithm in a cognitive radio network so that the 
secondary users in the communication range of the primary user erroneously conclude that the primary 
user is active and vacate the channel. 
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SSDF attack: The spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack is carried out by malicious secondary 
nodes in cognitive radio network to transmit false spectrum sensing data to other nodes. This attack can 
be catastrophic since sending of false spectrum sensing information to a data collector in the network can 
cause the data collector to make a wrong spectrum sensing decision.   
Hidden node problem: The hidden node problem arises when a node of a cognitive radio network is in the 
protection region of a primary user but it fails to detect the existence of the primary user due to a physical 
obstacle or for other reasons, and transmits in the same frequency bands of the primary user, causing 
harmful interference. 
 
REVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. What is a wormhole attack? Why this attack is difficult to detect in a WSN? 
2. What are the different ways in which spectrum sensing can be done? 
3. Explain why trust and reputation-based systems are popular in designing security systems in WSNs 
and CWSNs? 
4. How data aggregation can be done in WSNs in a privacy-preserving manner? What is 
homomorphic encryption? What do you mean by fully homomorphic functions? 
5. Explain three mechanisms for identification and defending against the primary user emulation 
attack in CWSNs. 
6. What do you mean by “belief-manipulation attack” on cognitive radio networks? Why these attacks 
are critical in CWSNs? Discuss a few mechanisms for detecting and preventing these attacks in 
cognitive radio networks? 
7. What types of DoS attacks can be launched on CWSNs? Discuss various mechanisms for 
preventing jamming attacks on CWSNs and cognitive sensor nodes. 
8. What do you mean by tamper-resistant hardware? How tamper-resistant hardwares and trusted 
platforms can be used to defending against physical attacks on sensor nodes in a CWSN? 
9. Discuss some of the well-known cryptographic protocols and key management mechanisms that 
can be efficiently deployed in WSNs and CWSNs? 
10. Identify some of the future research challenges in the field of CWSNs in general, and security and 
privacy aspects of these networks in particular.  
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